Should the SPD enter another “grand coalition” with Angela Merkel’s
CDU? Is Merkel actually a progressive—or as progressive as German politics can
be at this point? What is likely to happen in German politics in the next few
weeks/months? Judith Meyer, a
computational linguist and German political activist (she works with Yanis Varoufakis’
DiEM25 movement), is a singularly astute
observer of German politics; she has kindly allowed me to share some of her
recent insights with readers. Herewith, an interview with Meyer conducted over
email.
Q: Should the SPD enter another grand coalition?
A: No.
It would deal a deep blow to German democracy. It must be possible for the
voters to effect a change of government and change of policy. For 12 years now
we had the same government (except of a brief stint of CDU-FDP that was in no
way different than the others) and we should have it for another 4 years?? That
only happens in dictatorships. People decided to rout the SPD in order to force
a change. The SPD only got 20% and was forced to swear a holy oath to not have
another grand coalition this time. If they go back on it, they will be 10% next
time the people have a chance to vote.
All
the more because the CDU breaks its coalition contracts, e.g. one of the SPD's
key campaign demands last time was that there should be a state contribution
towards the pensions of those who have worked at least 40 years and whose
pension is still below 850 EUR / month (the poverty line for Germany is 1033
EUR / month), in order to combat the rising number of elderly poor we see
searching the trash bins. This did not happen. And just recently, it was the
vote of the CSU minister that approved glyphosate to continue to be used for
another 5 years in the EU. There had been a massive EU-wide and Germany-wide
mobilisation against glyphosate, which is why the SPD (though not the CDU) had
decided to take a strong stance against it. Under the conditions of the
coalition agreement, with one partner being in favour and another against, that
meant that Germany would have had to vote 'abstain' at the European level. Now
however, Germany voted in favour and due to its population weight approved it
for all of the EU. Following this, both SPD, Greens and FDP said that they do
not consider CDU to be capable of coalitions. (On another issue, the European
parliament had also voted against approving it and it's deeply concerning that
the "government" of the EU chose to treat its parliament as a mere
advisory body.)
Schulz promised that
there would be a vote among all SPD members on whether to accept the coalition
contract. I think that his team will come to an agreement in order to let the
SPD members be the ones to refuse. Approval for a Grand Coalition is currently
only 25% in the general population (38% in favour of new elections, 14% for
CDU-Greens minority government and 11% for CDU-FDP minority government); among
SPD members 36% are in favour, while state-level SPD leaders attach significant
conditions. I think as soon as some quid-pro-quo becomes known, the probability
that SPD members will approve the coalition contract will be close to zero.
We'll have new elections. The parties already agreed on a date: 22 April.
Plenty of time for all parties to re-assemble and for public opinion to yield a
very different result.
Q: At times, Merkel
seems to act like a progressive. Should we consider her as such?
A: I think German
politics cannot be fully understood by American standards. The entire political
spectrum is to the left of the US. In the Romney/Obama election, a mock vote
among Germans came out 95% in favour of Obama, because most of his radical
ideas were considered self-evident here. See this article of mine for a summary
of some differences: http://qr.ae/TbcqJ3 So seen within this spectrum rather
than the American one, CDU is still right of center, and SPD is approaching
right of center ever since the Seeheimer circle (of which Schröder is the most
famous) took over party leadership and forced neoliberal or at least third way
policies.
Merkel has given no sign
of being interested in less than business-centric policies, so she is still
considered right of center here. That does not prevent her from sharing, to
some extent, the pro-refugee attitude that forms part of society's consensus
here, and which can be found both on the far left (Die Linke) and the far right
(FDP). Until recently we did not have any party in parliament that was
anti-refugee, as the nationalist NPD and its predecessors always failed to take
the 5% hurdle. Also keep in mind that our constitution is unique worldwide in
stating an unequivocal and individual right to asylum (and was written after
WWII, at a time when Germany was hosting 12 million refugees on a population of
70 million, so "being overwhelmed" is not a valid argument to suspend
the constitution on this matter). Refusing an asylum seeker at the border,
before their case can be heard, rejected and the refugee has had a chance to
sue against the rejection, would simply be unconstitutional.
We learned later that
this was one of the reasons Merkel made that fateful decision in summer 2015:
according to eyewitnesses, after police and military had already been withdrawn
from other regions in order to reinforce the borders, she called a last meeting
of the minister of the interior, heads of police, heads of military and so on,
and asked for two guarantees: 1) that her decision to repel the refugees would
not be deemed unconstitutional by a court, and 2) that there would be no ugly
Nazi-evoking pictures of German militarised police and dogs against refugee
kids. Since nobody was willing to give those guarantees, she called it off.
Welcoming the refugees was in line with popular sentiment at the time - the
police had to ask people several times to stop coming to the train stations and
shelters with gifts because there were too many. There was a party atmosphere.
A month later, among CDU voters, 47% were still in favour of opening the
borders and 41% against. Of course this has petered out now with the media
reporting more and more about the difficulties of hosting so many refugees,
especially with the federal government not doing its part - relying entirely on
volunteers to organise language courses, often not refunding municipalities for
the extra accommodation and food expenses, and so on.
Franz Josef Strauß
(former CSU leader) famously proclaimed that there must not be any
democratically legitimated party to the right of the CDU/CSU. The article makes
reference to that. In other words Merkel's party was supposed to absorb enough
of the mild xenophobes so that no truly xenophobic party could enter
parliament. They did this by including, under their big umbrella, the segment
that might be called 'family values voters' in the US. People who are not just
against foreigners but also against gays, against non-traditional gender roles,
to some extent against the disruption of technology and so on. It's chiefly
these people that turned against Merkel. But Merkel wouldn't have remained
chancellor for 12 years and counting if she hadn't alienated these people by successfully co-opting issues to the left of these voters.
Whenever there was an
issue that looked big enough to unseat her (and not a moment before!), she
added it into her world view. One famous example is gay marriage. The CDU/CSU
leadership has long maintained that civil unions are good enough for
homosexuals and they don't need access to civil marriage. However, gay marriage
is absolutely uncontroversial in Germany with some 70% in favour even among the
CDU/CSU voters (and a small majority of CDU/CSU voters even in favour of
adoption rights for homosexuals). Shortly before this year's election, it
looked like SPD, Greens and Linke would make gay marriage one of their rallying
cries for the election campaign - so Merkel quickly convened a vote, in which she
said that personally as a Christian she still doesn't favour gay marriage but
she doesn't want to prevent anyone else from voting for it, so Germany approved
gay marriage just before parliament went on break and the topic could no longer
be used in the campaign.
Similarly with the
nuclear issue after Fukushima. Originally the SPD-Green government had enacted
a law requiring nuclear power plants to gradually shut down. This was the
biggest victory ever for German Greens and quite left them without a purpose,
no other big topic to rally around. Merkel essentially undid this law at the
beginning of her chancellorship, allowing nuclear power companies to pay to
keep the power plants online for decades longer. Then after Fukushima, she saw
the huge movement against nuclear power - the Greens temporarily polled over
20% - and hastily decreed that the nuclear power plants have to shut down in
even less years than the original SPD-Green plan. Of course since she's a
friend of business, she also decided that the German government would pay power
companies very handsomely for breach of contract, lost profits, disposal of
nuclear waste and so on. The German population as a whole is more
environmentalist than most Western societies (see the World Values Survey) but
CDU/CSU and especially FDP have always played the role of defending big
business against these interests, they never had any environmentalist policy
ideas of their own that the population wasn't already loudly clamouring for,
and sometimes not even then, as can be seen with the CSU's glyphosate vote just
now, 2 million signatures against glyphosate, a SPD coalition contract obliging
them to vote 'abstain', the European parliament also voting against, and yet
the CSU minister at the EU level just approved glyphosate for five more
years...
CDU/CSU is not leftist
in the sense of pro-refugee (more than AfD but not more than anyone else in
Germany's party spectrum until now), definitely not leftist in the sense of
environmentalist or civil rights, and definitely not leftist in the sense of
welfare and workers' protections. The SPD however is considered to no longer be
left, due to adopting CDU/CSU positions for the 12 years they were partnered...
Q:
What else should Americans keep in mind when thinking about German politics?
A: I feel that our
political ideas lead to a lot of talking past one another, probably because
ideas like introducing minimum 3 weeks paid vacation would be considered
socialist policy in the US, while it would be an attack on workers' rights here
;-) , where the state already guarantees 28 days' paid vacation and in practice
6 weeks isn't rare. We have to consider the direction of change and the ideological
justification that parties use.
The biggest
misconception is usually regarding the FDP. Think of them as libertarians, or
as close to that as any dare to be without falling into political oblivion in
Germany. We would place them to the right of CDU. They used to have the
subtitle "Party for rich people" in their logo (!), they are
extremely favourable to global trade deals, pro big business, against workers'
protections, against regulation, against environmentalism... Like leftists,
they were in favour of gay marriage and against mass surveillance, but that's
no more than libertarians do in the US. Now after this year's elections they
are pivoting to try to steal anti-immigrant votes from AfD...
Q: How significant do
you think it is that the Jusos (the SPD youth group) have come out against a
new grand coalition? There's no real analogue to the Jusos here in the States.
A: Wasn't it that
Democrats under the age of 35 were overwhelmingly in favour of Sanders, while
the party heads had early on decided on Clinton? I don't think our young people
are so different. The young people of any establishment party always have
stronger opinions and more idealism (or at least less pragmatism) than the old
guard, who are used to doing politics a certain way and who have to consider
their position within the party or their job in parliament in deciding what
view to take on any issue and how strongly to defend that view. The only
difference is that in Germany, every couple decades or so there is a new
popular party that embodies the spirit of the new generation, as with Bündnis
90/Die Grünen embodying all the political views that the 1968 generation became
famous for, and the Piratenpartei embodying a generation shaped by the
internet, with party membership reflecting those demographics.
An aside: the
establishment parties in Germany, compared to those in other countries,
were/are particularly tone-deaf about the internet in their utterances and in
the policies they tried to enact. Also, even today none of the German
government and very few MPs use Twitter. I wouldn't be surprised if a majority
still had their secretaries print out emails for them. The Pirate Party peaked
at 13% in the polls in 2012 and entered 4 state parliaments at 7-9%. Now
however they have deconstructed for various reasons and the big parties are
trying to absorb as many Pirate members and voters as possible, with digital
campaigns that are a far cry from what we've seen in the US, UK or France
even.
With this understanding,
the SPD members strongest in favour of a new Grand Coalition are those that are
afraid of losing their MP positions at a new election, or those that supported
Sigmar Gabriel and who are afraid they will lose their position in the pecking
order if Martin Schulz prevails. Meanwhile the youth organisation Jusos has an
innate desire to change the world (albeit those joining SPD for that purpose
must necessarily be less ambitious, and more ready to accept existing
hierarchies, than those joining Greens or Linke, which are more horizontal
organisations and less satisfied with the status quo), and this desire is
certainly amplified by the idea that a change in party direction would also
bring other people to the top (the Jusos don't currently have anyone near the
top).
Four years ago, we
already had this situation: some of the SPD were strongly against the Grand
Coalition, and the Jusos were among the strongest opponents, welcoming Sigmar
Gabriel with loud protests when he visited their assembly ahead of the
coalition treaty being signed. In the end, the SPD membership voted 75.96% in
favour of the coalition treaty (details on the vote turnout etc: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/spd-mitgliederentscheid-sozialdemokraten-stimmen-fuer-grosse-koalition-a-939081.html). This is possible because Jusos, and young
people in general, are a very small part of SPD. The Jusos organisation counts
ca. 70,000 members (stable, non-increasing for the past 10 years). Every SPD
member under 35 is automatically a member of Jusos and additionally there is a
possibility to sign up as a Jusos member without being a member of SPD, which
was 20,000 people last time I checked. So Jusos might be 50,000 out of the
SPD's current 443,000 members. (Aside: this is a huge decrease from the
70s: in the 70s, SPD had over a million members and Jusos had 300,000. The
decline in membership is across all parties except the Greens) The average
age of SPD members is now 60; only 32% of party members are women.
I believe that this year the opposition to the
Grand Coalition is much stronger than in 2013, both within Jusos and in the
general party, certainly among the voters. More people have understood that the
Grand Coalition is harmful to the SPD, including to their own chances of being
elected or re-elected. The party leader and candidate for chancellor Martin
Schulz himself is strongly against the Grand Coalition. That being said, there
is a penalty in German society for not being ready to play ball (the FDP is
suffering now), so I think it's most likely that the Grand Coalition will be
rejected by a party vote rather than the leadership accepting the blame for the
talks failing.
Q: Could you tell us a little more about what’s happening
within the German left—broadly defined—these days?
A: I'm on the board of the Democracy in Europe
Movement 2025 (DiEM25), a transnational pro-European anti-austerity movement /
party initiated by former Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis (with whom I
work on a daily basis) and which also counts Noam Chomsky, Saskia Sassen, Susan
George, Naomi Klein, Slavoj Zizek, Ken Loach, John McDonnell and others among
its advisors. Due to my work for this organisation, I am particularly attuned
to what is happening in the left-of-center in Europe. A broad breakdown of the
movements within the German left parties:
SPD:
neoliberal/pro-European or socialist/green/pro-European
Green:
green/pro-rich/pro-European or green/socialist/pro-European
Linke:
socialist/anti-European or socialist/xenophobic/anti-European or
old-Communist/authoritarian or socialist/green/pro-European
So if the SPD goes the
way of a Grand Coalition, it may find itself losing supporters to a new
grouping, while if it doesn't, it may find itself renewed from within. Of
course another important factor is of the leadership fight between Wagenknecht
(socialist/xenophobic/anti-European) and Kipping (socialist/green/pro-European)
in Linke. Germany may look calm so far but is unlikely to stay that way, no
matter which way the dice fall.
Q: How should we
understand the rise of the Pirate Party and similar formations in Germany and
elsewhere?
A: As I alluded to further above, I see the Pirate
Party's success mainly as a result of the other parties' failure to understand
the concerns of internet users (e.g. protecting civil liberties on the net,
greater transparency and opportunities for participation, very progressive
views in general), along with a generational shift that might have been due
anyway.
That being said, one interesting
aspect that sets them apart from establishment parties is also "fun" (and it applies even more to DIE PARTEI, which doesn't have a program beyond "fun"). I am not sure if / how this plays out in
other countries, but M5S (Five Star Movement in Italy) was founded by a
comedian, so maybe they are more fun than the establishment parties, too?
In both the Pirate
Party and DIE PARTEI, fun can be found for example in less-than-serious
campaign posters. The Pirate Party uses some fun posters among serious ones,
while DIE PARTEI's posters are all fun and not all have a message. Examples:
Apart from that, there
are many ways that the Pirate theme could be (and was) used for fun. That
involves e.g. costumes and theme actions (boat-based campaigning), but also one
of the key party slogans of all times: "Klarmachen zum Ändern"
(make ready to change), a play on words with the actual pirate phrase
"Klarmachen zum Entern" (make ready to board).
Even beyond the Pirate
theme, party conventions would involve ball baths, and the rules of both party
conventions and parliamentary group sessions recognise a right for anyone to
demand a vote on immediate "pony time": the communal watching of the
children's cartoon series 'My Little Pony: Friendship is Magic' in order to
restore harmony at the time of infighting. For inexplicable reasons, this
children's TV series is popular with (adult) nerds even beyond the Pirate
Party. (https://www.thedailybeast.com/inside-the-bizarre-world-of-bronies-adult-male-fans-of-my-little-pony)
Some of the fun
elements, especially the ones referencing nerd culture and online culture,
definitely were a hindrance to the Pirate Party's expansion in Germany. Also
there are a lot of people, especially among older Germans, who have a strict
view of where jokes and un-seriousness are acceptable and where not (e.g.
professionals like lawyers and doctors mustn't tell their clients jokes, all
professionals must wear suit & tie or whatever passes for a uniform of the
trade,...). But it seems that there is nevertheless a good share of German
voters that likes the idea of more fun in politics, or accepts it as a
distinguishing feature from the establishment.
Q: Thank you Judith!